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random profit maximization framework. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 
manufacturing establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 
municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. We find that local taxes on business and 
property deter new manufacturing establishments. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to 
the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies to identify the 
effects of taxes on the location of new establishments. 
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Steuerdifferentiale bei den Standorten intraregionaler Firmen: Belege aus neuen 
Produktionsbetrieben in spanischen Gemeinden 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny and Albert Solé-Ollé 
  
 
ABSTRACT:  
In diesem Beitrag wird empirisch analysiert, wie sich Unterschiede bei lokalen Steuern auf 
den intraregionalen Standort neuer Produktionsbetriebe auswirken. Diese Auswirkungen 
werden im Rahmen der zufälligen Gewinnmaximierung untersucht. Wir untersuchen die 
Standortentscheidungen von mehr als 10.000 Produktionsbetrieben, die sich im Zeitraum 
von 1996 bis 2003 in mehr als 400 Gemeinden der spanischen Region Katalonien 
angesiedelt haben. Wir stellen fest, dass lokale Steuern auf Unternehmen und Eigentum 
neue Produktionsbetriebe abschrecken. Es ist notwendig, die Auswahl für den lokalen 
Arbeitsmarkt einzuengen; insbesondere jedoch muss auf Agglomerationswirtschaften 
kontrolliert werden, um die Auswirkungen der Steuern auf den Standort neuer Unternehmen 
zu identifizieren. 
Key words:  
Lokale Steuern 
Firmenstandort 
Agglomerationswirtschaften 
Poisson-Regression 
Jel Codes: R3, H32. 
 
 
Diferencias impositivas en la ubicación de empresas intrarregionales:  ejemplo de 
nuevos establecimientos de fabricación en municipios españoles. 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny and Albert Solé-Ollé 
 
ABSTRACT:  
En este artículo analizamos empíricamente de qué modo las diferencias en los 
impuestos locales influyen en la ubicación intrarregional de nuevas plantas de 
fabricación. Examinamos estos efectos en un marco aleatorio de maximización de 
beneficios. Estudiamos las decisiones de ubicación de más de 10.000 
establecimientos de fabricación entre 1996 y 2003 en más de 400 municipios en 
Cataluña. Observamos que los impuestos locales en negocios y propiedades 
disuaden a los nuevos establecimientos de fabricación. Es necesario limitar las 
opciones al alcance del mercado laboral local, y sobre todo controlar las economías 
de aglomeración a fin de identificar los efectos de los impuestos en la ubicación de 
nuevos establecimientos.  
Key words:  
Impuestos locales 
Ubicación de empresas 
Economías de aglomeración 
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Regresión de Poisson  
 
Jel Codes: R3, H32. 
 
Page 3 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres  Email: regional.studies@newcastle.ac.uk
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 1 
1.-Introduction 
The effect of taxation on the location of economic activity is a topic that has interested 
scholars and policy makers alike. The extent to which firms respond to tax differentials is an 
issue of major concern for tax setting governments. In particular, governments may want to 
foresee the outflow of firms following a tax increase in order to assess how tax revenues and 
local employment are affected by changes in tax rates. A high degree of sensitivity to tax 
differentials on the part of firms can, thus, erode the tax autonomy of governments that may 
be engaged in tax competition processes1. 
Although initial attempts at quantifying empirically the impact of taxes on the location 
of economic activities date back some decades the question is still open. Besides, evidence 
from countries other than the U.S. is limited2. BRETT and PINKSE (2001) did not find strong 
evidence that local business property tax rates exert any effect on business location across 
municipalities in British Columbia. FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2002) use differences in 
corporate and personal income tax across Swiss Cantons to provide evidence that taxes affect 
the location of firms and employment within this country. BUETTNER (2003) finds 
municipal capital tax rates to be a determinant of the local tax base using a panel of German 
municipalities. For Spain, SOLÉ-OLLÉ and VILADECANS-MARSAL (2003) examine local 
employment growth within the metropolitan area of Barcelona and report an elasticity of 
around -0.5 for local business and property tax rates, the main loca  taxes levied in Spain. 
DURANTON et al. (2006) conclude that municipal property taxes in the UK have a negative 
impact on firm employment growth but no effect on firm entry.  
Analyzing empirically the extent to which taxes affect firms’ location decisions is by 
no means straightforward, given the range of other factors underlying this particular decision. 
Moreover, tax rates are not exogenous in the sense that they respond to jurisdictions´ 
characteristics. This implies that any location determinant which turns out to be correlated 
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with local tax rates is a potential source of bias if remains uncontrolled. BARTIK (1991a), in 
his review of the role played by taxes on the location of economic activities, points out that 
empirical studies conducted at the intrametropolitan level, as opposed to the intermetropolitan 
one, have generally found larger taxes´ effects. These findings may not be independent of the 
difficulties faced when seeking to measure interregional variation in key location factors such 
as wages, workforce characteristics, transportation facilities and the business climate3. When 
jurisdictions are defined at a spatial scale which is small enough, a natural control for this 
range of location determinants is to focus on the location of firms between jurisdictions that 
belong to the same city-level economic area. The reduced size of municipalities in the region 
of Catalonia (946 municipalities covering an area of 32 thousand Km2) provides an 
appropriate institutional context to develop this empirical strategy. In particular, we will look 
at the location of firms within groups of municipalities that constitute 41 self-contained local 
labor markets. In this paper we study the location of manufacturing establishments. Since 
manufactured outputs are targeted at national or supranational markets, we can abstract from 
any local demand considerations that may affect the location decision of firms. Hence, the 
advantage of analyzing the location of manufacturing activities within local labor markets is 
that we can focus on a short number of firm location determinants, namely, local taxes, 
building rents and agglomeration economies. 
Agglomeration economies refer to the advantages a firm obtains from locating close to 
other firms. In Figure 1 (Graphs 1 and 2), the partial correlations between tax rates (business 
and property tax) and manufacturing employment (a raw measure of agglomeration 
economies) for municipalities in Catalonia are depicted. These correlations are positive and 
large (in the 30-40% range). One explanation for these correlations has been provided in the 
literature concerned with the study of tax competition in the presence of agglomeration 
economies. In this setting, firms may be willing to pay a higher tax bill in order to locate close 
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to other firms. This means that some governments may be able to set a high tax rate while 
hosting large amounts of economic activity4. There are, however, other plausible stories that 
can explain the positive correlation between tax rates and agglomeration economies. For 
instance, the cost of providing public services may be particularly high in urban 
agglomerations and this may translate into higher tax rates. Regardless of the mechanism 
driving these correlations, taking into account the benefits firms obtain when they co-locate in 
space may be important in order to identify the effect of tax rates on the location of economic 
activities. A feature that distinguishes this paper from other studies analyzing the effect of 
taxes on the location of economic activities is that we measure agglomeration economies more 
accurately. We jointly consider a measure of the advantages firms obtain from locating close 
to firms within the same industry (so called localization economies), a measure of the 
advantages firms obtain from locating close to firms of other industries (urbanization 
economies) and a measure of the advantages firms obtain from the sectoral diversity of the 
local economy (diversity effects). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Most studies examining the role of taxes in the location of economic activities have 
focused on either employment levels or employment growth. However, as BARTIK (1991b) 
points out, it might be preferable to study a particular location decision rather than to model 
employment levels and changes. By focusing on a particular decision, rather than modelling 
the aggregate result of the creation, closure, expansion and contraction of plant processes, it 
should be possible to impose greater structure on the analysis and, hence, yield more precise 
estimates of the effects that are of interest to us. We adopt the random profit maximization 
framework to analyse the location decision of new establishments. This empirical strategy has 
at least two advantages. First, SCHMENNER’s (1982) study reveals that managers will first 
decide whether or not to start-up a new establishment and only then will they take a decision 
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regarding the location that best suits their needs. This means we can focus on an 
establishment’s location decision in isolation of any consideration of the processes underlying 
the decision to start-up. Second, it enables us to consider the explanatory variables as being 
pre-determined.  
In this study we analyze the role of local taxes in determining the location of new 
manufacturing establishments across municipalities in the Spanish region of Catalonia using 
the random profit maximization framework. This analysis sheds some extra light on a topic 
that has not received a great deal of attention in the European context. The empirical 
application we carry out has two distinctive features. First, we analyze the location of new 
manufacturing establishments between municipalities that belong to the same local labor 
market. This enables us to control for city-level firm location determinants. Second, three 
different types of agglomeration economies are jointly considered, namely, localization, 
urbanization and diversity effects. Following this introduction, the rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, following on from this introduction, we present a model 
that sets up the location problem of the firm. Then, an empirical application follows. We 
describe the dataset and variables in Section 3.1 and then introduce and explain the 
econometric specification in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we discuss the results obtained. In 
Section 4, we present a summary and the main conclusions of this paper. 
2-The model 
The aim of a competitive firm belonging to industry s is to choose simultaneously a 
location and a level of inputs that yield the highest level of profits. There are J jurisdictions 
each firm can choose to locate in and, conditional on locating in j, the problem of the firm i is 
to choose the level of machinery (K), labor (L) and buildings (N) that maximize the following 
profit function: 
         ),,( iiisjijiili NKLTNRKrLwYP −⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅                                    (1) 
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The price of a manufactured output ( P ) is assumed to be common for all firms in the 
region. The prices of the three inputs used by firms are expected to vary at different 
geographic levels due to different degrees of mobility. The rental price of machinery ( r ) is 
assumed to show no variation within the region. Wages are assumed to vary across local labor 
markets (wl), whereas the rent of industrial buildings (Rj) may differ from one location to 
another. The local tax bill ( sjT ) depends on the level of all the inputs considered and the 
industry of the firm, s. Output is denoted by Y  which is assumed to be obtained by the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
               
δααα εµ ))(exp()exp()( 321 ijiiiisjij NKLAY ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=                                        (2) 
where 1321 <++≡ αααk  denotes the returns to scale of the production function in the priced 
inputs; sjA  is a Hicks’ neutral productivity shifter capturing the agglomeration economies of 
site j for firms whose activity falls into industry s; iµ  is a hicks neutral establishment-specific 
productivity constant; ijε  stands for an identically and independently distributed (iid) zero 
mean Weibull random variable that changes over firms and locations; and δ  is a positive 
constant. 
The problem of simultaneously choosing a location and the optimal level of inputs can 
be reduced through the profit function to one in which firms choose the location where the 
level of profits is the highest when inputs are chosen optimally. This is equivalent to choosing 
the location where the log of the profit function, scaled by δ/)1( k− , takes its highest value: 
            
 /1 )/ln(/                                          
)/ln(/)/ln(/                                          
ln/1 ln/1/)1(ln
3
21
0
ijisjj
sjsjl
sjisjisj
NTR
KTrLTw
APk
εµδδα
δαδα
δδϕπδ
+⋅+∂∂+⋅+
∂∂+⋅+∂∂+⋅+
⋅+⋅+=≡−⋅Π
            (3) 
where Π  is the profit function and 0ϕ  stands for a constant term. To accommodate 
expression (3) into the random profit maximization framework, the following normalizations 
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are carried out. Notice that the units of machinery can be set in such a way that the price is 
unity (i.e., 1=r ). Given that λλ ≈+ )1ln(  for low values of λ , it must be that for low tax 
rates, as is the case here, )/ln( KTr sj ∂∂+  approaches KTsj ∂∂ /  if K is set at the appropriate 
scale. We assume that within a region, wages do show variation but within certain limits. 
Hence, by choosing the appropriate scale for the units of labor, the wage can be redefined as 
one plus a wage premium ( ll ww ~1+= ). The same reasoning can be applied to the rents of 
buildings ( jj RR ~1+= ). After these normalizations, expression (3) can be expressed as:  
      
 /1)/(/)/(/)/(/        
// ln/1 ln/1
321
310
ijisjsjsj
jlsjisj
NTKTLT
RwAP
εµδδαδαδα
δαδαδδϕπ
+⋅+∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+≈
            (4) 
where 201 −=ϕϕ . Expression (4) is a conditional logit model whose parameters can be 
estimated, up to a δ/1  scale, by maximum likelihood. MCFADDEN (1974) shows that given 
the assumption regarding ijε , the probability that firm i locates in j is given by: 
                    ∑ ε−πε−π=
j
isjisjisjisjij )exp(/)exp(p                                           (5) 
where the variables that do not show variation across locations (i.e. iP µϕ ,,1 ) drop out of the 
analysis5.  
3.-Empirical exercise 
3.1.-Data and variables 
The empirical analysis is carried out using a rich dataset containing information on the 
universe of new and relocating manufacturing establishments settling in the Spanish region of 
Catalonia between 1996 and 20036. This dataset, the Industrial Establishments Registry, 
contains information on the establishments created including data concerning employment, 
location and activity. The level of sectoral desegregation considered is the 2-digit industry 
classification yielding 18 manufacturing industries7. In the first row of Table 1, we report the 
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number of establishment entries and the number of municipalities for which data are 
available. Roughly speaking, we are dealing with municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants hosting some type of industrial activity8. The municipal data sources, variable 
definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2] 
Local taxes: Local governments in Spain are moderate in size (their expenditure 
represents 13% of total public expenditure), with only a third of local government budgets 
being funded by intergovernmental grants. More than half of their own revenues are raised by 
taxes, while the remainder consists of user charges. The property tax (Impuesto sobre la 
propiedad immueble) is the main source of collected tax revenue (half of all revenues), 
although it is small in comparison to the U.S. Whereas an average U.S. property owner is 
charged around 0.75% of the market value of their property9, in Spain this falls to about 
0.14%10. The local business tax (Impuesto sobre actividades económicas), the second largest 
source of revenue (18% of local tax revenue), is the largest local tax firms have to bear. To 
indicate the relative size of these two taxes we compute the average tax bills per unit of 
establishment surface for Catalonia. The business tax is equivalent to 4.5€/m2, while this 
measure falls to 2.25€/m2 in the case of the property tax11. Manufacturing establishments 
average 790 m2 in our sample. For such an establishment, this yields bills of around 1,800€ 
and 3,600€ for property and business taxes, respectively. Three other taxes complete the 
picture of local taxation: a tax on vehicles, a tax on building activities, and a tax on the sale of 
land and buildings12. Although the revenue raised by these three taxes is not negligible, it 
should be noted that only a share of them is borne by business activities. 
When local taxes are considered as a whole, the burden that the business sector has to 
bear is significant. If we only consider business and property taxes, together they yield a local 
tax bill of around 0.45% of the market value of a firm’s buildings (in the case of the 
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remaining taxes, we are completely unaware of the share of revenue that the business sector 
has to bear). Although this level of local taxation is low in comparison to that of the U.S., the 
difference in the order of magnitude is not so great. Besides, municipal governments are given 
remarkable tax autonomy. Statutory tax rates can vary by a two to three-fold factor across 
municipalities. Bearing in mind that we are analyzing the location of firms in neighboring 
municipalities, we expect local tax differentials to be large enough to influence the location of 
new establishments. In this analysis we focus solely on the property and business taxes, the 
main local taxes paid by business13. Therefore, we can characterize the local tax liability of 
firm i of the sth industry in municipality j as pisjbisjisj TTT +≈  where b and p stand for the 
business and property taxes, respectively. The business tax bill depends on all the inputs used 
by the firm whereas the property tax bill is only increasing in the usage of buildings. 
Therefore, we can write LTsj ∂∂ /  as LT
b
sj ∂∂ /  and KTsj ∂∂ /  as KT
b
sj ∂∂ /  while NTsj ∂∂ /  
decomposes as NT bsj ∂∂ / + NT
p
sj ∂∂ / . 
The local business tax liability of each firm ( bisjT ) is based on a presumed level of 
profits that is established in accordance with the observed level of input usages and the 
economic sector of each firm14. This presumed level of profits is determined by national tax 
laws that do not make any distinction as regards location. This industry specific level of tax 
liability iNsiKsiLs NKL ⋅+⋅+⋅ φφφ( ) is then modified at the municipal level by being multiplied 
by a coefficient set by local governments ( bjτ )15. Hence, we can characterize the tax bill for a 
firm i belonging to industry s in municipality j as bisjT )( iNsiKsiLsbj NKL ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅≡ φφφτ  where 
L
sφ  ,
K
sφ  and Nsφ  measure the way in which national tax laws assess how profits in industry s 
increase differently with an extra unit of labor, machinery and buildings, respectively. Hence, 
it is possible to decompose )/()/( )/()/()/()/( 321 NTKTLT bsjbsjbsj ∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅ δαδαδα  into 
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two terms, an industry-specific constant (i.e. NsKsLs φδαφδαφδα ⋅+⋅+⋅ )/( )/()/( 321 ) times 
the municipal business tax rate, bjτ . Moreover, this constant captures the percentage squeeze 
on profit levels when the municipal business tax rate increases by one unit. If this share is 
similar across sectors (after all, the business tax is levied on a presumed level of profits for all 
industries), then this coefficient can be expected to be roughly the same for all sectors. The 
business tax rate can range from 0.8 to 1.9. There exists substantial cross-section variation in 
this variable. In 1999, a quarter of municipalities set a business tax rate below 1.1 whereas 
another quarter chose a rate that was above 1.4 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). 
The local business tax was reformed by a law passed in 2002. From 2003 onwards, all 
self-employed and very small firms, with sales below 1 million €, became exempt from this 
tax. At the same time, the tax burden was partly shifted towards larger firms, for whom the 
tax burden increased by 30% on average16. Thus, the reform is expected to decrease the 
sensitivity of small firms to tax differentials and to increase the effect of taxes on the location 
of larger firms. We design two subsets of firms that we consider would be affected by the 
reform in a different manner: on the one hand, an establishment with 1, 2 or 3 registered 
employees is considered small, while an establishment with 4 or more workers is considered 
large17. The numbers of entries falling into these two categories are reported in the second and 
third rows of Table 1. 
The property tax is charged to the owners of land and building structures and no 
distinction is drawn between industrial and residential usages. The property tax bill ( pijT ) of 
firm i if located in municipality j results from the product of the property nominal tax rate 
( pjt ) and the ratable value per unit of surface ( jv ) times the surface of buildings used, i.e. 
ij
p
j
p
ij NvtT ⋅⋅= . We are interested in measuring how the property tax bill increases when we 
increase the surface of buildings in one unit ( N/T psj ∂∂ ). Therefore, in this analysis, the 
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 10 
relevant measure of the property tax rate is obtained as the nominal tax rate times the ratable 
value per unit of surface of industrial buildings, i.e. j
p
j
p
j vt ⋅≡τ . Hence, we need a proxy of 
the ratable value of a representative unit of an industrial building. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available and, instead, we use the mean of the ratable value of all properties 
found in location j. Governments are free to choose a nominal tax rate between 0.4 and 1.1%. 
That is, property owners are asked to pay a share (between 0.4 and 1.1%) of the ratable value 
of their properties. There exists a great deal of heterogeneity across locations although low tax 
rates are generally preferred. For instance in 1999, a quarter of municipal governments set a 
property tax rate below 0.45 whereas another quarter chose a tax rate above 0.7. Differences 
in the average ratable value of properties across municipalities are great and further increase 
property tax bill differentials (See Table 2 for descriptive statistics). 
Agglomeration economies: The term agglomeration economies can be used to denote 
any mechanism that causes economic activities to cluster in specific locations. At the 
intraregional level, the type of agglomeration economies we have in mind are technological 
externalities. In the presence of technological externalities, a firm’s productivity comes to 
depend on the economic scale and composition of its economic environment (ROSENTHAL 
and STRANGE, 2004).  
Agglomeration economies of the type we are looking at have been found to be of very 
limited geographical scope. ROSENTHAL and STRANGE (2003), using U.S. zip code level 
data, analyze the scope of agglomeration economies by estimating external effects between 
firms localized at various distances. These authors find that such external effects fall sharply 
after the first 1.6 km. VAN SOEST et al. (2006) analyse this same issue using data from the 
Netherlands where zip code areas are remarkably small, they average 5.65 Km2. It is found 
that agglomeration economies in a zip code have little effects elsewhere in terms of 
employment growth and firm birth. In our dataset, the urban area of the municipalities 
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averages 1.3 km2 whereas the mean total surface is 34 km2. Therefore, one can expect that 
external effects do not spill over municipal borders to a very large extent. In fact, 
VILADECANS-MARSAL (2004) finds that, for most industries, there is no evidence of 
external effects taking place between neighbouring Spanish municipalities18. 
Agglomeration economies for a firm of the sth industry found in location j, sjA , are 
expected to be summarized by the following expression: 
                             
4321
0
ψψψψ
jjsjsjsj DSEMOKA ⋅⋅⋅⋅≡
                                               (6) 
where 0K  stands for a constant; sjO  denotes the ths  manufacture employment in location j 
whereas sjM  captures the remaining manufacturing employment found in municipality j. This 
distinction is made in order to take into account the fact that the benefits for two firms from 
co-localizing in space may be larger between same industry firms than between two firms that 
belong to distinct activities. The non-manufacturing employment level, sjSE , is introduced in 
order to capture the advantages manufacturing firms derive from locally provided services. 
The productivity gains derived from one’s own manufacturing employment levels ( sjO ) are 
known in the literature as localization economies. The benefits stemming from the remaining 
levels of employment ( sjsj SEM + ) are often called urbanization economies in a distinction 
that dates back to HOOVER (1936). JACOBS (1969) sustains that diverse economic 
environments favor the productivity of firms through the cross-fertilization of ideas. To test 
this last hypothesis we introduce the variable Dj, which accounts for the diversity of the 
productive environment and which amounts to the inverse of a Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
that can be defined as follows: 
                                             ∑=
s
sjj share/D 21                                                     (7) 
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where sjshare  denotes the share of the overall employment in location j  that is devoted to 
activity s  (including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities). The larger the 
value of the index, the more diverse the described economic environment is. Equations (4) 
and (5) suggest that agglomeration economies should be considered in logs. We use o, m, se 
and d to denote the natural logarithm of O, M, SE and D. 
The rent of buildings: Unfortunately, we lack data on the rents of industrial buildings 
for the Spanish municipalities19. We circumvent this problem by looking at how pre-
established firms use labor in relation to buildings. Since wages are assumed to be constant 
across a local labor market, the aggregate municipal ratio of buildings with respect to labor 
should provide us with information about the variation in the rent of buildings within local 
labor markets. However, we need to take into account the fact that different aggregate ratios 
of labor to square meters of buildings may not only be the result of differences in relative 
prices but could also respond to variations in the industry mix of municipalities20. If we 
measure the rent of buildings using the aggregate ratio of labor to buildings we may overstate 
its variation within a local labor market. The reason for this is that firms needing particularly 
large buildings will tend to gather in locations where buildings are relatively cheap. 
Therefore, we need to account for the aggregate ratio of labor to buildings while controlling 
for the sectoral composition of municipalities. That is: 
                                          ∑ ⋅⋅=
s
sjs
j
j LN
R )(1 κ                                                   (8) 
where jN  is the surface occupied by manufactures in municipality j, sjL  is employment of the 
s
th
 manufacture in j and the sκ ’s are 18 parameters to be estimated. These should be high for 
sectors using large buildings intensively (high 13 /αα  ratios) and low for sectors that have 
lower space requirements (low 13 /αα  ratios)21.  
 
Page 15 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres  Email: regional.studies@newcastle.ac.uk
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 13 
3.2.-Econometric specification 
In the conditional logit framework the consistency of the estimates hinges on whether 
the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption holds or not. In the 
context of the firm location problem, the IIA assumption is problematic since some 
unobserved location determinants are likely to be correlated across nearby municipalities. The 
empirical strategy we follow consists in conditioning the choice set to be the local labor 
market in which we finally observe the establishment settles. This enables us to condition out 
any location determinant shared by municipalities within local labor markets. The local labor 
markets we use are built on the basis of daily work commuting22. Thus, they reflect groups of 
municipalities which show high levels of interaction. Hence, we are not only conditioning out 
wages but also other city-level location attributes such as workforce characteristics, 
transportation facilities, climate amenities and crime rates. 
In line with ROSENTHAL and STRANGE (2003), we assume that there exists a one-
year time lag between a new establishment decides where to locate and we observe the 
establishment settles in this location. Hence, we are interested in location probabilities of the 
following type: 
   
))/(exp(
))/(exp(
1
654321
654321
1,,/
∑ ∑
∑
=
+∈
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
=
lJ
j s
jtsjts
p
jt
b
jtjtjtsjtsjt
s
jtsjts
p
jt
b
jtjtjtsjtsjt
tljsij
NLdsemo
NLdsemo
p
βτβτβββββ
βτβτβββββ
          (9) 
where 4. and  3 2, 1,kfor  ,/1 =⋅≡ kk ψδβ ; Ns
K
s
L
s φδαφδαφδαβ ⋅+⋅+⋅≡ )/( )/()/( 3215 ; 
δαβ / 36 ≡ ; and . ,)/( 3 sss ∀⋅≡ κδαβ  
These location probabilities resemble those of a nested logit model which is often seen 
as a conditional logit where decisions are made sequentially. In this particular case, firm 
managers would first choose the local labor market in which to locate and would then choose 
the municipality that they like best within the local labor market. It turns out that the estimates 
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to be obtained by the estimation of expression (9) are precisely the same as those that would 
be obtained by estimating a nested logit model. At this juncture, we should make two 
comments in this respect. First, the approach we take enables us to control for the fact that 
different areas have different birth potentials. In other words, people are tied to a particular 
area and, hence, when an entrepreneur is looking where to locate a start-up, the additional 
advantages offered by a distant municipality may be offset by a personal preference for 
locations that are located more close at hand. Thus, not all jurisdictions are equal substitutes 
for each other. Given the fact that we observe more entrepreneurs in large cities with more 
agglomeration economies and higher tax rates, this statistical control may be important. In the 
second place, it might be that in the case of large and very mobile firms (e.g. multinational 
plants) the choice set we consider does not correspond to the actual choice set. Even if this 
were to be true, the consistency of our estimates does not rely on assuming that we are 
specifying the choice set correctly, since to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of 
interest all that we require is that the independence of irrelevant alternative assumptions holds 
between each pair of alternatives being considered in our estimation. 
 GUIMARAES et al. (2003) shows that the conditional logit parameters in expression 
(9) can be equivalently obtained by estimating a poisson regression model whose mean and 
variance are given by the following expression23: 
 
                   ))/(                                      
exp()()(
65
432111
∑ ⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+== ++
s
jtsjts
p
jt
b
jt
jtjtsjtsjtstlsjtsjt
NL
dsemonVarnE
βτβτβ
ββββα
            (10) 
where 1+sjtn  accounts for the number of firms of the s
th
 industry that locate in jurisdiction j  
during period t+1 and stlα  denotes a time-sectoral-Local Labor Market specific constant 
term24. The exponential mean Poisson regression model does not suffer from the incidental 
parameters problem that generally affects non-linear models (CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 
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1998). This implies that the consistency of the slope parameters does not hinge on the number 
of constant terms that needs to be fitted. 
3.3.-Results 
Main results: The maximum likelihood Poisson estimates of the location determinants 
of new and relocating establishments are presented in Table 3. In the first column of Table 3, 
we present the preferred specification, specification [1], that corresponds to that of the 
location of manufacturing establishments outlined in expressions (11). Auxiliary results are 
provided in specifications [2] and [3]. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The high number of statistically significant variables reported in specification [1] 
suggests that the model fits the data satisfactorily. A likelihood ratio test has been computed 
indicating that the model is statistically significant at any reasonable level. Moreover, the 
variables take the sign that theory predicts. That is, local taxes and the proxies used to capture 
the rent of buildings seem to discourage the arrival of firms, whereas agglomeration 
economies are an attribute that firms value at the time of looking for a location25. 
The two local taxes - the local business tax and the property tax - seem to be relevant 
determinants of the location of new manufacturing establishments. Both the business tax and 
the property tax coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
( 0 , 65 <ββ ). Given that these variables do not enter the model in logs, the estimated 
coefficients do not tell us much about the dimensions of these effects26. Hence, we have 
computed the average elasticity for these two taxes. The estimated elasticity of the business 
tax rate is -0.52 whereas the elasticity of the property tax rate is -0.13. As mentioned, the list 
of papers we can compare our results with is extremely limited. Since the paper by SOLÉ-
OLLÉ and VILADECANS-MARSAL (2003) focuses on employment growth, it is difficult to 
assess the degree to which these results are comparable. Our elasticities are in general smaller 
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than those that they report, above all in relation to property tax. Nevertheless, the results we 
report are in the same range as those found by these authors. In particular, the elasticity we 
obtain for the business tax rate is close to the figure they report for the overall employment 
growth equation (-0.5) and, similarly, we found an elasticity for the property tax rate that is 
close to the one they provide for the growth in services employment (-0.18). These elasticities 
are also small in comparison to the average intrametropolitan result found in the U.S., which 
BARTIK (1991a) quantifies at -2. However, if we take into account the size of the taxes 
considered in this analysis, we deem our elasticities plausible. 
The tax effects we report are only for new and relocating establishments. These 
establishments are already on the move and, for them, tax differentials do not have to 
overcome the cost of changing jurisdictions. Hence, our results could correspond to a setting 
where moving costs were zero. In this respect, our view is that the elasticities for tax rates that 
we report are upper bounds of the elasticities of the tax base with respect to tax rates.  
The results also suggest that agglomeration economies play an important role as firm 
location determinants since all the coefficients of the variables of agglomeration economies 
are found to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Since all these variables 
are measured in logs, the coefficients have an elasticity interpretation. The variable pinning 
down the localization economies (o) seems to play an important role in the firm’s location 
decision, presenting an elasticity of around 0.40. The variables capturing the urbanization 
economies (m and se) have elasticities of 0.25 and 0.12, respectively. This suggests that 
localization economies outweigh the advantages resulting from the presence of employment 
in distant economic activities. The diversity of the economic environment also shifts the 
productivity of firms, becoming a valuable attribute for firms in search of a location. The 
elasticity lies around 0.22 supporting Jacobs’ hypothesis. The results obtained for the relative 
importance of these location determinants are in line with the results reported in the 
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literature27. We have also computed the average marginal effects that are implicit in our 
agglomeration estimates in order to contextualize our results more closely with other 
studies28. Our localization economies’ estimate implies that 100 extra workers in a particular 
industry will increase the expected number of start-ups in the same industry by 0.097. In the 
case of urbanization economies, a 100-worker increase outside the industry increases the 
number of start-ups by 0.04 if these are manufacturing workers and 0.01, otherwise. These 
estimates are in the upper limit of the results reported by ROSENTHAL and STRANGE 
(2003). One possible explanation is that, unlike these authors, we hold rents and taxes at a 
fixed level.   
In the second column of Table 3, specification [2], we report the results obtained when 
we do not restrict the choice set to the local labor market level. When the choice set is 
considered to be the entire region of Catalonia, some coefficient estimates do change, if not 
always dramatically. In particular, the coefficients (and the elasticities) of the business tax rate 
and the property tax rate drop by 55% and 22%, respectively. This suggests that the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption does not hold at the regional level. This 
can also be tested statistically. The second row from the bottom in Table 3 reports the log-
likelihood functions of the different specifications. Since specification [2] is obtained by 
keeping the sector-year-local labor market dummy variables equal regardless of the local-
labor market of the municipality, a likelihood ratio test can be performed. The value this test 
takes is over 2,000, which clearly exceeds the critical value of a Chi-Square distribution with 
1,378 degrees of freedom at the 1% level. Hence, our data seem to indicate that there are 
important location factors that show up in the local labor market or/and, for some 
entrepreneurs, not all municipalities are equal substitutes for each other. This supports our 
empirical strategy of restricting the choice set to nearby locations. 
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Specification [3], whose results are reported in the third column of Table 3, omits the 
agglomeration economies’ variables. The point of running such a regression is to assess the 
consequences of failing to account for the benefits firms obtain from the economic scale and 
composition of different locations. The property tax estimate remains unchanged. In contrast, 
the business tax effect switches sign becoming positive (and statistically significant at the 1% 
level). Moreover, the implied elasticity is very large (exceeding 3). The fact that 
municipalities hosting large amounts of economic activities set higher tax rates and still be 
preferred by new locating establishments may explain this large bias. This finding shows the 
importance of controlling for agglomeration economies when estimating the effects of taxes 
on the location of economic activities. 
Robustness checks and additional results: In this subsection, we first explore if the 
estimates are robust to several specification issues (Table 4). After, we conduct the analysis 
for small and large firms, separately (Table 4). The main point of this exercise is to confirm 
that the reform of the local business tax passed in 2002 has affected small and large firms in a 
very asymmetric manner.  
To control for the level of some local public expenditures can be relevant for 
identification purposes (i.e. higher tax bills may be financing better services which are valued 
by firms). Unfortunately, we lack data on current expenditures in which we can identify the 
programmes that firms may put a value on. Hence, we are not able to address this question, 
empirically. However, we feel that this is not a major issue in our analysis for two reasons. 
First, in Spain, differences in tax capacity (i.e. tax bases per capita) do not enter the formula 
to distribute unconditional grants to municipal governments. As a result, the link between tax 
effort and total revenue is particularly week since differences in tax capacity are 
uncompensated29. Second, in Spain, municipal governments are not in charge of the provision 
of some publicly provided inputs firms may be particularly interested in. For instance, it is 
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upper-level governments who are responsible to provide education and transportation 
facilities. As a robustness check, we have included the natural log of overall municipal public 
expenditure per capita in specification [4]. Although the expenditure per capita coefficient is 
positive, its elasticity is very small and statistically insignificant and, moreover, produces no 
major changes in the parameters of interest. The inclusion of the remaining local taxes (results 
not reported), namely the vehicle tax, the building activities tax and the tax on sales of land 
and buildings has also been considered. These taxes have been found to be statistically 
insignificant and to have no effect on our estimates of interest. This may be due to the fact 
that these taxes represent very light burdens. 
[Insert Table 4] 
As mentioned above, papers by ROSENTHAL and STRANGE (2003), VAN SOEST 
et al. (2006) and VILADECANS-MARSAL (2004) have found agglomeration economies to 
decay sharply with distance. As a robustness check, we include two different spatial lags of 
the agglomeration economies’ variables considered in the analysis. The first set of spatially 
lagged variables for municipality i is based on employment found in municipalities within a 
10 km band from municipality i. Likewise, the second set of spatially lagged variables is 
based on employment found in municipalities within a band ranging from 10 to 20 km 30.  
Results are reported in the second column of Table 4, specification [5], and they can be 
summarized as follows. First, the estimates of the taxes’ effects in terms of sign and order of 
magnitude are insensitive to the inclusion of the spatial lags of the agglomeration economies’ 
variables. Second, the own municipality agglomeration economies’ effects estimates are 
largely unaltered by the inclusion of their spatially lagged counterparts. Third, we find some 
evidence that firm locations decisions are not only affected by own municipality 
agglomeration economies but also by those of neighbouring jurisdictions. This evidence 
comes primarily from the up to 10 km band variables. The fact that agglomeration economies’ 
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variables are measured in logs makes own municipality variables and their spatial lags not 
directly comparable. The average employment level rises from 2,000 (municipal level) to 
25,000 (up to 10 km band) and to 75,000 (10 to 20 km band), implying that spatial lags have, 
in terms of marginal effects, much smaller impacts than own municipalities’ variables (See 
footnote 25). 
Since, to the best of our knowledge, there are no papers that control for the rent of 
buildings by looking at how pre-established firms use labor with respect to buildings’ surface, 
we estimate specification [1] using the density of the population as a proxy of building rents. 
This approach has been used in BARTIK (1985) and GUIMARAES et al. (2004), the 
rationale being that population and manufactures compete for the use of land. Density takes 
the correct sign if higher densities are to pick up higher building rents. Although some 
coefficient estimates experience non-negligible changes, the sign and order of magnitude of 
the estimates remain unchanged, providing our analysis with consistency. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, from 2003 onwards, all self-employed and very small 
firms have become tax exempt, while the tax burden on larger firms has been increased. As 
such the reform is expected to decrease the sensitivity of small firms to tax differentials and 
increase the effect of taxes on the location of larger firms. We, therefore, estimate the model 
for small and large firms separately while specifying two different slopes for the business 
tax31. One slope is for firms entering the market in the time period spanning 1996-2002 when 
the pre-reform business tax law applied. The second slope is for establishments locating in 
2003 when we expect most managers would have considered the new tax code, the final 
details of which were made known in October 2002. The results obtained for small and large 
firms are reported in the first two columns of Table 5 (specifications [7] and [8]). 
[Insert Table 5] 
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Our results suggest that small firms were more sensitive to business tax rate 
differentials than their larger counterparts during the pre-reform period. While the average 
elasticity implied by the coefficients for large firms approaches -0.32, the elasticity found for 
small firms stands at around -0.75. This suggests that, during this period, the business tax 
liability for a small firm represented a larger share of its profits than was the case for a larger 
firm. By contrast, the elasticity of the property tax rate appears to be equal for small and large 
firms, -0.14. As expected, our results suggest that the reform has reduced the sensitivity of 
small firms to tax differentials. In fact, the estimated coefficient for the post-reform period is 
not statistically different from zero. Results in the opposite direction are found for the subset 
of large firms. The reform has increased their sensitivity to business tax differentials. The 
elasticity of interest rises remarkably, from -0.32 to -0.82. Notice that this set of results 
corroborates the nature of the effects of the business tax and, therefore, enhances the 
consistency of this analysis. 
Although the reform was passed in 2002, it constituted a cornerstone of the electoral 
campaign run by the conservative party that won the national election by a wide margin in 
March 2000. This means that establishments locating in 2001 and 2002 might have partly 
anticipated the effects of the reform. To determine whether this was the case, we split the pre-
reform business tax slope into two different coefficients - one for firms entering the market in 
the time period spanning 1996-2000 (pre-election), and the other for new establishments in 
search of a location in 2001 and 2002 when managers might have anticipated the effects of 
the reform (post-election). Our results are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 5 
(specifications [9] and [10]). The estimates of the business tax for firms locating in 2001 and 
2002 have been found to lie between the pre-election and post-reform period estimates for 
both small and large firms. This supports the idea that, during 2001 and 2002, the reform was 
partly anticipated. 
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In the case of agglomeration economies, there are relevant differences in how small 
and large firms value the characteristics of the economic environment of locations. 
Employment in services (sej) and the diversity of the economic environment (dj) seem to be 
two attributes small firms place considerable weight on (the elasticities are 0.24 and 0.34, 
respectively). By contrast, large firms seem to care less about these location features (the 
coefficients are, respectively, 5 and 2 times smaller). A possible interpretation of these results 
is that large firms are less dependent on external services and on tacit knowledge than small 
firms. Large firms seem to be fonder of manufacture employment than their smaller 
counterparts. This holds both for own industry (oj) and other manufacturing employment (mj). 
For the variable reflecting localization economies (oj) the estimated elasticities are 0.43 and 
0.34, respectively. In the case of other manufacturing employment (mj), the elasticities are 
0.31 and 0.15. 
4.-Summary and conclusions 
In this study we have focused on the role of local taxes in determining the location of 
new manufacturing establishments across municipalities in Catalonia, a region of Spain, 
during the period 1996-2003. This analysis sheds some extra light on a topic that has not 
received a great deal of attention in the European context. The empirical application we carry 
out has two distinctive features. First, we analyze the location of new manufacturing 
establishments between municipalities that belong to the same local labor market. This 
enables us to control for city-level firm location determinants. Second, compared to previous 
contributions to this literature, this paper provides a more accurate treatment of agglomeration 
economies. In particular, three types of agglomeration economies are jointly considered, 
namely, localization, urbanization and diversity effects. 
Taxes do matter. The estimated tax elasticity for the business tax is close to -0.52. 
Significantly lower is our estimated elasticity for the property tax, which is around -0.13. The 
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size of these effects is in the lower bound of the results reported by SOLÉ-OLLÉ and 
VILADECANS-MARSAL (2003) for Spain. Given the moderate quantitative importance of 
these local taxes in Spain, we consider our estimates to be reasonable. A reform of the local 
business tax that was implemented during our period of study shifted part of the tax burden 
from small to larger firms. Our results suggest that this reform has decreased the sensitivity of 
small firms to tax differentials, whereas the opposite is true for large firms. This enhances the 
consistency of our estimates. 
Restricting the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, accounting for the 
presence of agglomeration economies is of paramount importance for identifying the role of 
local taxes in the location of economic activities. In particular, the omission of the variables 
of the agglomeration economies results in a severe underestimation of the negative effect of 
the local business tax on the location of manufactures. This can be explained by the fact that 
municipalities choosing high tax rates are also hosting large amounts of economic activities 
and, due to the existence of agglomeration economies, these are the preferred alternatives for 
new locating establishments. 
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Footnotes 
1
 See WILSON (1999) for a review of the tax competition literature. 
2
 The early literature for the U.S. case is reviewed in BARTIK (1991a) and HERZOG and 
SCHLOTTMANN (1991). These authors conclude that taxes affect the location of economic 
activities to some extent. More recent evidence from the U.S. has confirmed this result. See 
HINES (1996), GOOLSBEE and MAYDEW (2000), MARK et al. (2000) and 
HAUGHWOUT et al. (2004).  
3
 HINES (1996) may be the most convincing exercise at showing the effect of taxes on the 
allocation of economic activity across U.S. States. For that purpose, he exploits the fact that 
some foreign investors receive home-country credits for taxes paid abroad while others do 
not. Investors from countries where tax payments made abroad are deductible at home are 
found to be over-represented in high-tax U.S. States. 
4
 The seminal papers are LUDEMA and WOOTON (2000) and KIND et al. (2000). A review 
of this literature can be found in BALDWIN et al. (2003), chapters 15 and 16. 
5
 Notice that although no firm-specific information aside from industry is used, the model 
accommodates heterogeneity across establishments in the form of a hicks neutral 
establishment-specific productivity term. The idea is that more productive firms make more 
profits but that leaves the location probabilities unchanged. 
6Catalonia is a region of north-east Spain. In 1999, it had 6.2 million inhabitants living in 946 
municipalities. This amounts to 15% of Spanish population. Catalonia can be considered as 
being relatively dynamic in terms of economic activity. In 1999, its share in the Spanish 
employment was 18% and its unemployment rate was significantly lower than that of the 
whole Spanish economy (10% vs. 15%). When it comes to industrial employment, Catalonia 
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was even more over-represented in 1999 (its share in the Spanish industrial employment was 
26%). 
7
 The Industrial Establishments Registry uses the 3-digit industry classification. However, 
data on local employment from the Social Security Register is only available at the 2-digit 
level. Therefore, the analysis is performed at this latter level of sectoral desegregation. 
8
 There is a substantial increase in the number of municipalities for which data are available in 
year 2000. This is due to the fact that business tax rates are only available for those 
municipalities exceeding 1,000 inhabitants before this date. 
9
 According to the U.S. Census of Communities 2005, the median home value in 2005 was 
213,900 $ whereas the median real estate tax was 1,614 $. 
10
 Data refer to 2003. The average home market value in Spain was 193,100 € while the 
average ratable value was 35,000 €. Data sources are the Sociedad de Tasación, a firm 
providing valuations of real estate properties, and the Property Assessment Office. The 0.14 
percentage is obtained as (35,000/193,100)*0.0077, where 0.0077 is the mean (population 
weighted) of the nominal property tax rate. 
11
 The business tax equivalent is the result of dividing total business tax revenue by the sum 
of the surface of all business establishments. To obtain an idea of the property tax bill per unit 
of surface is not so straightforward as the share of this tax revenue paid by business is 
unknown. We have aggregated the surface of residential and business properties to compute a 
measure of the property tax per unit of surface (assuming that businesses pay as much as 
home owners per unit of surface). On average, we obtain a property tax bill of 2.25€/m2. Data 
Sources are the Catalan Institute of Statistics and the Ministry of Economics. 
12
 Municipalities are under no obligation to levy the latter two taxes. 
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13
 In the results section (3.3), we address the role of the remaining local taxes. However, these 
are found to be statistically insignificant and their exclusion does not affect our results. 
Therefore, we focus solely on the business and property taxes. 
14
 The business tax code proxies labor with the number of workers, machinery with power 
capacity and building surface area with m2 of establishments. 
15
 This municipal tax rate can be raised or cut depending on the location of the firm within the 
municipality. Each local government can sort streets into a small number of categories. Then, 
a specific business tax rate is applied to the firms located in each of these street categories. 
Municipalities are also entitled to offer tax cuts to benefit new establishments during their 
first years of trading. However, municipal data on the business tax code other than the 
municipal tax rate are poor and not very informative. Therefore, we summarize the business 
tax burden in location j by means of the municipal business tax rate, bjτ . 
16
 In the new tax code, local business tax rates vary according to sales’ intervals. 
17
 The effects of the reform differ with establishment sales rather than with employment. 
However, our knowledge of new establishment size is limited to the number of employees 
reported at the time of registering the establishment. To set an employment level that reflects 
1 million € sales, we use the SABI database that contains more than 1 million Spanish firms. 
We extract all manufacturing firms in the region of Catalonia in 2002 (16,882 firms). On this 
sample, we run sales on number of employees (up to a 4th order polynomial). The model fits 
the data remarkably well (R2 is 0.90).4 employees gives the closest prediction to 1 million € 
sales.   
18
 The robustness of our results to this specification issue is addressed below. In particular, we 
include spatial lags of the agglomeration economies’ variables.  
19
 Nor can the ratable value of the property tax be used as a proxy given that reassessments 
are not carried out simultaneously in all municipalities 
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20
 This acknowledges the point stressed by GYOURKO (1987) in his analysis of the between-
cities variation in the aggregate ratio of labor to capital between cities. This author breaks the 
variation down into two phenomena: the economic sector composition of the city and the 
within industry factor intensity variation. 
21
 Expression (8) can be derived using Hotelling’s lemma. The analytical derivation is 
available from the authors upon request.  
22
 The local labor markets to which we refer have been computed by ROCA and MOIX 
(2004). Municipalities are aggregated in groups according to commuting considerations. 
Broadly speaking, each local labor market is built to ensure people live and work within its 
boundaries. This methodology differs from the British Local Labor markets in that a 
municipality cannot in itself constitute a local labor market. We consider the 945 
municipalities to make up 41 local labor markets. With this level of aggregation, 
approximately 75% of the people live and work in the same local labor market. 
23
 This result also holds for Hessian standard errors. 
24
 
stlα  cannot be computed if, for industry s in time period t+1, there are no firms locating in 
any location within local labor market l. Hence, the number of observations changes over the 
specifications. 
25The coefficients associated with the variables that proxy the rent of buildings have been 
omitted to save space given the difficulty in interpreting them. 
26
 When a variable is interpreted in terms of its impact on the expected number of firms 
locating (nsjt+1) its coefficient has an elasticity interpretation if the variable is measured in 
logs. If it is measured in levels, the average elasticity can be obtained by multiplying the 
coefficient by the sample mean of the regressor, sjtx⋅β . 
27
 See ROSENTHAL and STRANGE (2004) for a review of this literature. 
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28
 If the variable xsjt is expressed in logs, the average marginal effect can be obtained as 
)/( sjtsjt xnβ ⋅  where sjtn  is the sample mean of the dependent variable.  
29
 The correlation between overall expenditure per capita and the tax rates is around 16% and 
24% for the business and the property taxes, respectively. 
30
 Euclidean distances between the centres of activity of municipalities have been computed. 
31
 See Section 3.1 for a definition of small and large firms. 
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Table 1. Number of new establishments and municipalities by year. 
Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
New establishments (all) 1319 1664 1733 1065 1175 926 1127 1163 
New establishments 
(small)1 567 620 716 432 441 392 380 368 
New establishments 
(large)2 751 1,032 1,009 626 734 524 731 765 
Municipalities 259 396 414 412 410 636 631 631 
Notes: 1. Small (1-3 workers). 2. Large (≥  4 workers). 3. Employment data is missing for  
those new establishments not included in either of the two categories. 
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Table 2. Definition of municipal variables. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Mean (st. dev.) 
Variable Definition Data sources 1999 Increase 1995-20021 
Business tax rate; bjτ  Municipal coefficient to be applied to a 
presumed firm-specific 
level of profits 
Ministry of 
economics2  
1.357 
(0.187) 
0.074 
(0.105) 
Nominal property tax 
rate; pjt  
Nominal property tax 
rate 
Property 
Assessment 
Office 
0.567 
(0.154) 
0.059 
(0.100) 
Assessed value per 
unit of surface; jv  
Mean of the ratable 
value of buildings  
Property 
Assessment 
office 
20.898 
(14.388) 
5.034 
(5.711) 
Property tax rate; pjτ  j
p
j vt ⋅  Property Assessment 
office 
12.145 
(8.486) 
4.097 
(3.349) 
Manufacturing 
employment; mj 
ln of workers employed 
in manufacturing 
activities 
Social Security 
Register 
4.128 
(2.317) 
0.213 
(0.838) 
Non-manufacturing 
employment; sej 
ln of workers employed 
in non-manufacturing 
activities 
Social Security 
Register 
4.462 
(2.173) 
0.596 
(0.524) 
Diversity index; dj ln of the inverse of a H-
H index of sectoral 
concentration 
Social Security 
Register 
4.890 
(2.957) 
0.064 
(1.789) 
Manufacturing ratio of 
labor to buildings 
surface; Lj/Nj 
Manufacturing workers 
over square meters of 
industrial buildings 
Catalan Institute 
of Statistics & 
Social Security 
Register 
0.053 
(0.177) 
0.019 
(0.099) 
Notes: 1. Changes in municipal attributes within municipalities between 1995 and 2002. 
2. Municipal yearbooks (1995-1999) and database (2000-2002). 
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Table 3.-Location determinants. Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimates. 
Dep.Variable is the count of new establishments of industry s in municipality j 
and time period t+1 (nsjt+1). 
   Variable [1] [2] [3] 
    
(i) Local tax rates       
-0.387 -0.249 2.643 Business tax rate: bjtτ  (-4.67)*** (-3.24)*** (36.39)*** 
-0.011 -0.009 -0.012 Property tax rate: pjtτ  (-4.90)*** -(2.55)*** (6.09)*** 
(ii) Agglomeration economies     
0.403 0.416 -.- Own manufacture  
employment:osjt (34.89)*** (41.06)*** -.- 
0.248 0.190 -.- Manufacturing 
employment: msjt (12.04)*** (11.09)*** -.- 
0.124 0.135 -.- Non-manufacturing 
employment:sejt (7.29)*** (9.53)*** -.- 
0.224 0.261 -.- Diversity index:djt (5.36)*** (6.67)*** -.- 
Rent of buildings: 
sNL jtsjt ∀,/  
Yes Yes Yes 
Local Labor Market  
Dummies Yes No Yes 
No. Dummies 
)( lts ××  1,520 142 1,520 
Log-likelihood -13,564 -14,585 -16,538 
No. Observations 21,914 21,914 21,914 
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis are z-statistics. 2.*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
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Table 4.-Robustness analysis. Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimates. Dep.Variable is the 
count of new establishments of industry s in municipality j and time period t+1 (nsjt+1). 
   Variable [4] [5] [6] 
(i) Local tax rates      
-0.399 -0.388 -0.559 Business tax rate: bjtτ  (-4.127)*** (-4.350)*** (-6.888)*** 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.022 Property tax rate: pjtτ  (-3.023)*** (-3.054)*** (-9.730)*** 
( ii) Own manufacture employment: osjt 
0.397 0.398 0.394 Own municipality (30.488)*** (34.079)*** (34.451)*** 
-.- 0.181 -.- Up to 10 km 
-.- (8.871)*** -.- 
-.- 0.034 -.- 10 to 20 km 
-.- (1.047) -.- 
( iii) Manufacturing employment: msjt 
0.261 0.285 0.184 
        Own municipality (11.145)*** (13.677)*** (9.825)*** 
-.- -0.436 -.- 
        Up to 10 km 
-.- (-11.660)*** -.- 
-.- -0.027 -.- 
        10 to 20 km 
-.- (-0.407) -.- 
(iv) Non-manufacturing employment: sejt 
0.115 0.106 0.148 Own municipality (5.938)*** (6.031)*** (8.780)** 
-.- 0.153 -.- Up to 10 km 
-.- (5.435)*** -.- 
-.- -0.095 -.- 10 to 20 km 
-.- (-2.515)** -.- 
(v) Diversity index: djt 
0.232 0.251 0.272 Own municipality (4.939)*** (5.872)*** (6.798)** 
-.- 0.220 -.- Up to 10 km 
-.- (2.644)** -.- 
-.- 0.496 -.- 10 to 20 km 
-.- (3.412)*** -.- 
0.026 Ln of expenditure per  
Capita (0.450) -.- -.- 
-5.677 Density of population -.- -.- (-2.497)** 
Rent of buildings: 
sNL jtsjt ∀,/  Yes Yes No 
Local Labor Market  
Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. Dummies 
)( lts ××  1,295 1,520 1,519 
Log-likelihood -10,844 -13,426 -13,571 
No. Observations 17,861 21,914 21,691 
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis are z-statistics. 2.*, **, ***: statistically significant at the90%, 95% and 
99%, respectively. 
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Table 5.-Location determinants for small and large establishments.  
Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimates. Dep. Variable is the count of new 
establishments of industry s in municipality j and time period t+1 (nsjt+1). 
   Variable Small 
  [7] 
Large 
  [8] 
Small 
  [9] 
Large 
  [10] 
 
(i) Local tax rates 
Business tax rate: bjtτ  
-0.559 -0.237 
      Business pre-reform  
      (1996-2002) (-4.08)*** (-2.13)** -.- -.- 
-0.599 -0.134 
                   Pre-election 
                   (1996-2000) -.- -.- (-4.06)*** (-1.15) 
-0.426 -0.562 
       Post-election 
       (2001-2002) -.- -.- (-1.86)* (-3.12)** 
-0.332 -0.607 -0.329 -0.612       Business post-reform  
      (2003) (-1.02) (-2.82)*** (-1.01) (-2.84)*** 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 Property tax rate: pjtτ  (-3.14)*** (-4.16)*** (-3.10)*** (-4.25)*** 
(ii) Agglomeration economies 
0.342 0.437 0.342 0.437 Own manufacture 
employment: osjt (17.93)*** (29.84)*** (17.93)*** (29.84)*** 
0.146 0.315 0.146 0.315 Manufacturing 
employment: msjt (4.63)*** (11.51)*** (4.63)*** (11.52)*** 
0.245 0.048 0.244 0.050 Non-manufacturing 
employment: sejt (9.06)*** (2.14)* (9.01)*** (2.22) ** 
0.339 0.165 0.340 0.164 Diversity index: djt (4.95)*** (3.081)* (4.96)*** (3.07)* 
Rent of buildings: 
( sNL jtsjt ∀,/ ) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local Labor 
    Market dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Dummies 
)( lts ××  1,022 1,140 1,022 1,140 
Log-likelihood -6,898 -9,693 -6,898 -9,691 
No. Observations 18,010 19,558 18,010 19,558 
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis are z-statistics. 2.*, **, ***:  statistically significant at the 90%, 
95% and 99%, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Correlations between tax rates and manufacturing employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are referred to year 2000 and variables are expressed in deviations from the local labor 
market mean. 
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